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SECRET

PTQ3570

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

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ORIGIN SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AEX-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	TEDE-00
	INR-00	VCE-00	M-00	NEA-00	NSAE-00	IRM-00	DSCC-00
	SAS-00	/001R					

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SOURCE: KODAKC.008070

DRAFTED BY: S/S-S:DAKONEFF -- 03/05/01; EXT. 75131

APPROVED BY: S/S:CCWALSH

NEA:NWALKER

S:AWOLFF S/S-O:KMERTEN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 041824

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/11

TAGS: OVIP (POWELL, COLIN P.) PREL, XF, SA

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 26 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH SAUDI CROWN
PRINCE ABDULLAH

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY NEAL
WALSH, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
2. (U) FEBRUARY 26, 2001, CROWN PRINCE'S PALACE, RIYADH
3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

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U.S.:

THE SECRETARY

WYCHE FOWLER, AMBASSADOR

EDWARD S. WALKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN
AFFAIRS

BRUCE RIEDEL, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

ALEX WOLFF, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

CHARLES BRAYSHAW, NOTETAKER

GEMAL HELAL, INTERPRETER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 MAR 2021
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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SAUDI ARABIA:

CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AL FAISAL
AMBASSADOR TO U.S. BANDAR BIN SULTAN

4. (S) SUMMARY: IN HIS MEETING OVER LUNCH WITH CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH, THE SECRETARY BRIEFED ABDULLAH ON THE GENERAL APPROACH THE U.S. INTENDED TO TAKE IN DEALING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

B1

THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WAS ANXIOUS TO WORK WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE REGION TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH ON IRAQ IN ADVANCE OF THE ARAB SUMMIT IN AMMAN IN MARCH. END SUMMARY

5. (S) DURING LUNCH AT THE CROWN PRINCE'S PALACE, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE APPROACH THE U.S. INTENDED TO TAKE
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IN RESPONSE TO THE EROSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS REGIME FOR IRAQ.

THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WOULD BEGIN BY SPEAKING FIRST AND FOREMOST ABOUT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, NOT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. PEOPLE NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND THAT WMD WAS THE ISSUE, NOT FOOD. SECONDLY, THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES SHOULD ENSURE STRICT CONTROLS FOR WMD ITEMS AND STOP BLOCKING NON-MILITARY USE ITEMS THAT EMPOWERED SADDAM BY GIVING THE IRAQI PEOPLE CAUSE TO BLAME THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME, EVERYONE SHOULD RENEW EFFORTS TO STOP LEAKAGE IN THE SANCTIONS REGIME VIA JORDAN, TURKEY, AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

6. (S) WITH RENEWED UNITY WOULD COME LEVERAGE TO ALLOW UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS BACK INTO IRAQ, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED. IF SADDAM WOULD NOT ALLOW THE INSPECTORS TO

RETURN, THE ALLIES WOULD RETAIN CONTROL OF HIS MONEY. WE MUST ALSO RETAIN THE ABILITY TO STRIKE AT WMD TARGETS IN IRAQ IF REBUILT PRODUCTION FACILITIES WERE DISCOVERED.

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[REDACTED] THE SECRETARY TOLD ABDULLAH THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAD NOT MADE DECISIONS ON THESE ISSUES AND WAS
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ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF HIS FRIENDS. THE PRESIDENT
HOPED TO HAVE A NEW POLICY IN PLACE BY THE TIME OF THE
ARAB SUMMIT IN AMMAN.

7. (S) [REDACTED]

POWELL

SECRET

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